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IMPERFECT OATHS, THE PRIMED PRESIDENT, AND 




Presidential inaugurations frequently invite widespread civic celebra-
tion, the broad rhetoric of an incoming Chief Executive, and traditions 
stretching back for decades and even centuries.  The inaugural ceremonies 
of January 20, 2009 offered all this and something more: a set of important 
constitutional puzzles radiating from Barack Obama‘s imperfect recitation 
of his oath of office. 
At 12:04 p.m., Mr. Obama attempted to fulfill the Constitution‘s re-
quirement that each President take a prescribed thirty-five word oath 
―[b]efore he enter on the Execution of his Office . . . .‖1  During the recita-
tion, Chief Justice John Roberts (who was administering the oath) prompted 
Obama with both an incorrect word and several improper word sequences.  
At the end of their verbal exchange, Obama had uttered an inexact version 
of the presidential oath, including a pledge to execute ―the office of Presi-
dent of the United States faithfully‖ rather than promising to ―faithfully ex-
ecute‖ that office.2 
The errors in the oath-taking prompted immediate and widespread 
speculation and commentary: did problems with the administration and re-
citation of the presidential oath somehow render it invalid?  If so, had Ob-
ama failed to become President, perhaps leaving us with some other Chief 
Executive, or even no President at all?3 
On the evening of January 21, news sources began reporting that Mr. 





  Associate Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University.  The author thanks Scott 
Gant, David Rosen, and Irene Thomson for their thoughts and comments on this Essay. 
1
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (link).  
2
  Michael C. Dorf, When Did Barack Obama Officially Become Eligible to Act as President? What 
the Oath “Do-Over” Reveals About Legal Interpretation, FINDLAW, Jan. 26, 2009, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/DORF/20090126.html (link).  According to Professor Dorf, Mr. Obama 
also omitted the word ―the‖ in the phrase ―to the best of my ability.‖  Id.  Moreover, consistent with a 
longstanding tradition, Obama inserted his own name into the oath. 
3
  See Scott E. Gant & Bruce G. Peabody, Musings on a Constitutional Mystery: Missing Presidents 
and “Headless Monsters”?, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 83, 88–89 (1997) (examining whether delays in the 
1997 inauguration of Bill Clinton left the nation temporarily ―without a President‖). 
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the oath a second time.4  White House Counsel Greg Craig released a state-
ment indicating that although administration officials ―believe[d] that the 
oath of office was administered effectively and that the President was sworn 
in appropriately [at the January 20th inauguration ceremony,] . . . out of an 
abundance of caution, because there was one word out of sequence, Chief 
Justice Roberts administered the oath a second time.‖5  The second oath was 
taken without mishap.6 
Like other phrases intended to be reassuring, ―abundance of caution‖ is 
partly discomfiting: Exactly what was the Obama administration being cau-
tious about?  This Essay explores that question by considering whether the 
flaws in Obama‘s initial presidential oath had a legal impact on executive 
branch policies enacted before the second oath was rendered.  It also ex-
amines whether the 2009 ―oath episode‖ has broader implications for how 
we should approach future inaugurations and oaths. 
Part I of this Essay considers several possible relationships between the 
presidential oath and the start of a President‘s term, and assesses whether 
recitation of the oath is strictly necessary before a President can constitu-
tionally exercise presidential powers.  Part II turns to the significance of the 
particular words set out in the presidential oath, and offers reflections on 
how we might judge whether deviations from the oath ―script‖ should be 
considered consistent with the Constitution.  Part III checks my preliminary 
conclusion (that the Constitution requires a President to recite the oath ver-
batim before exercising the full powers of the presidency) against an ―ab-
surdity test.‖  The Conclusion reviews the Essay‘s core contentions about 
the oath and evaluates the real world consequences of my argument, if any, 
for both President Obama and for Presidents and inaugurations yet to come. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL OATHS, TERMS, AND EXERCISING EXECUTIVE 
POWER 
What is the relationship between the presidential oath and the presiden-
tial term?  The Constitution specifies that the President‘s term shall be ―of 





  See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut & Michael D. Shear, Obama Takes His Oath of Office Again, 




  Press Release, The White House, Statement from White House Counsel (Jan. 21, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/StatementfromWhiteHouseCounsel/ (link).  It is unclear 
precisely when Craig‘s statement was released.  According to the White House press release, the state-
ment was issued ―Wednesday, January 21st, 2009 at 12:00 a.m.‖  Id.  If one presumes this ―time stamp‖ 
means midnight on January 21, it is clearly erroneous since this would have been before the second oath 
was completed. 
6
  Press Release, The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (Jan. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press_Briefing_1-22-09/ (link).  When asked 
about the two oaths the following day, President Obama‘s press secretary Robert Gibbs reiterated the 
Office of the White House Counsel‘s position.  
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at noon on the 20th day of January . . . and the terms of their successors 
shall then begin.‖7  In the context of the 2009 Obama inauguration, a num-
ber of scholarly and legal commentators drew upon these constitutional 
provisions and concluded that whether the presidential oath is properly re-
cited is immaterial as a legal matter, so long as a new presidential term has 
commenced, the incoming President has been validly elected, and he or she 
otherwise qualifies for office.8  In this conception, once the clock struck 
noon on January 20, 2009, Mr. Obama, as a properly selected and certified 
President-elect, was transformed into a fully functional President of the 
United States. 
At first glance, this particular text-based argument seems rather appeal-
ing.  Unlike the other branches of government, the executive is in a kind of 
perpetual session, ensuring that ―the nation‘s heart [will] never cease to 
beat.‖9  Congress, in contrast, regularly schedules recesses during and be-
tween its sessions, moving in and out of formal operation.  Moreover, the 
federal legislature‘s capacity to conduct its work is always contingent on its 
members‘ presence since Congress must maintain a quorum even when in 
session.10  The comparative constancy of executive leadership—and, by ex-
tension, the continuing operation of the federal government as a whole—
might be jeopardized if we did not recognize that a new President assumes 
his or her office as soon as the old presidential term expires. 
Emphasizing the importance of an unbroken executive presence in our 
constitutional system does not, however, conclusively address the impact of 
a flawed inaugural oath on the status and power of an incoming President.  
Both the Constitution and federal statutes provide for continued executive 
leadership during circumstances where an elected President is unable to 





  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (link); U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1 (link).  Prior to the Twentieth 
Amendment, the date on which the President‘s new term was to start was fixed first by statute and then 
by the Twelfth Amendment (with March 4 as the chosen date).  Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (link). 
8
  See, e.g., Garance Franke-Ruta, Obama Isn’t the First President to Retake Oath—or Forgo Bible, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A3 (discussing a view attributed to Laurence Tribe that ―the presidency 
automatically transfers to the elected successor upon the departure of the previous president from the 
White House‖) (link).  
9
  James Ceasar, In Defense of Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS—DOES IT STILL 
WORK? 168, 168 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986). 
10
  The federal judiciary presents a slightly more complex picture, but again, relative to an executive 
branch presided over by a Chief Executive, the institutional presence of U.S. courts and their leadership 
is not as constant.  Federal law, for example, requires merely that the Supreme Court begin its term ―on 
the first Monday in October of each year,‖ allows the Court to adjourn, and stipulates that in the absence 
of more than three justices, the Court lacks a quorum for conducting business.  28 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) 
(link); 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (link); see also 28 U.S.C. § 48 (2006) (requiring only that the ―courts of ap-
peals shall hold regular sessions‖) (link), and 28 U.S.C. § 139 (2006) (―The times for commencing regu-
lar sessions of the district court for transacting judicial business at the places fixed by this chapter shall 
be determined by the rules or orders of the court.‖) (link).   
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head of the executive branch upon a President‘s ―removal . . . death, resig-
nation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said of-
fice . . . .‖11  Any constitutional problems arising from Obama‘s initial oath 
would not, therefore, automatically disrupt what appears to be a constitu-
tionally based commitment to uninterrupted executive leadership. 
So how should we understand the connection between the presidential 
oath and the start of a new presidential term?  Article II stipulates that 
―[b]efore he enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take‖ 
the designated presidential oath.  There seem to be three plausible interpre-
tations of this provision.12  First, we might read the requirement that a per-
son recite the oath as a bright-line barrier to becoming President.  In other 
words, a President-elect does not assume the status and powers of the Presi-
dent until she takes the oath.  Completing the oath, under this conception, is 
part of an obligatory constitutional threshold that a person must reach be-
fore she can assume and exercise the powers of President.13 
Second, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, we might contend that 
the oath is not constitutionally required before a person may exercise the 
powers of the Chief Executive.  In this view, the oath is essentially a cere-
monial reminder of both the President‘s duty to execute the law and the sta-
tus of the Constitution as supreme law.  Such a ―non-obligate‖ reading of 





  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (link). 
12
  This Essay sets aside a complete parsing of what behavior, activities, and powers are encom-
passed by the phrase ―[b]efore he enter on the Execution of his Office.‖  For purposes of clarity and 
simplicity, I assume that this provision refers generally to the exercise of the specific powers delineated 
in Article II.  But this view does not explain whether a President could use less formal power and au-
thority without reciting the oath.  Could a President who has not completed the oath properly still greet 
and even engage in diplomatic discussions with heads of state?  Speak to the nation from the Oval Of-
fice as a Chief Executive?  Threaten to issue a presidential veto?  These issues are complicated by the 
observation that in the United States, the head of the federal executive branch is a political and legal fig-
ure—armed with specific constitutional and policy powers—as well as an informal head of state.  See 
THOMAS E. CRONIN & MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE PARADOXES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 15 
(1993) (―The United States is one of the few in the world that calls on its chief executive to serve as its 
symbolic, ceremonial head of state and as its political head of government.‖). 
13
  It is also beyond the scope of this Essay to consider whether the Constitution‘s distinction be-
tween ―becoming‖ a President and ―acting‖ as President makes a difference in the context of the presi-
dential oath.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (allowing Congress to provide for a person who will ―act 
as President‖ if the President and Vice President are unable to discharge the powers of the office) (link); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (―if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President 
elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified‖) (link); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 
(allowing the Vice President to serve as ―Acting President‖ if the President cannot ―discharge the pow-
ers and duties of his office‖) (link).  It seems plausible to conclude that the Article II oath language only 
refers to a ―traditional‖ (as opposed to ―Acting‖) President, and therefore does not require an Acting 
President to recite the oath prior to performing his or her powers, whatever they might be.  See generally 
Gant & Peabody, supra note 3, at 87 n.14 (reflecting upon the constitutional ―distinction between be-
coming a President and acting as President‖). 
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tution lays out the ―eligibility‖ requirements for the presidency in Article II, 
section 1, and, notably, the oath is not listed among these prerequisites.14 
A third reading of the relationship between the oath, the presidential 
term, and the assumption of executive power is seemingly more idiosyn-
cratic.  Under this approach, a President-elect automatically becomes Presi-
dent upon the start of his new term, but is unable to ―enter on the Execution 
of his Office‖15 until he recites the oath.  The primed President must com-
plete the oath before she can constitutionally tap the power of the presiden-
cy.16  According to this view, if one concludes that Obama‘s January 20, 
2009 oath was fatally flawed, then he was, for a period of just over thirty-
one hours, a primed President incapable of fully executing his office. 
As each of the three conceptions delineated above leads to quite differ-
ent claims about the significance of the presidential oath and the full as-
sumption of presidential power, this Essay evaluates each approach from a 
variety of perspectives and interpretive modalities, beginning with the Con-
stitution‘s text. 
A. Constitutional Text 
As noted, the Constitution states: ―Before he enter on the Execution of 
his Office, he shall take‖ the presidential oath.  But to whom exactly does 
the ―he‖ in this sentence refer?  As the clause immediately prior to the oath 
provision references ―[t]he President,‖ and bars adjustments of presidential 
―compensation . . . during the Period for which he shall have been elected,‖ 
it seems reasonable to postulate that the subsequent oath language refers to 
the President. 
If this interpretation is correct, then the text casts considerable doubt 
on a reading of the oath provision that presumes that recitation of the oath is 





  The presidential eligibility clause includes, among other requirements, that individuals must be at 
least thirty-five years old and be a ―natural born Citizen‖ in order to be ―eligible to the Office of Presi-
dent.‖  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  But cf. MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE 
PRESIDENT‘S CONSTITUTIONAL OATH—ITS MEANING AND IMPORTANCE IN THE HISTORY OF OATHS 
170 (1999) (arguing that the presidential oath was taken ―very seriously by strong Presidents, who plain-
ly resisted any temptation to let it pass . . . as a mere ceremony.‖). 
15
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
16
  U.S. law is not without analogous arrangements to the primed President concept.  Under state 
law, marriage requires both the acquisition of a state-issued wedding license as well as execution of that 
license by the parties identified therein, typically through a ceremony that involves the recitation of 
vows (or some other affirmation) to signal mutual intention to go forward with the nuptials.  In other 
words, the license only primes—or initiates—the legal union, which still requires some more formal ap-
proval or oath to bring it into effect.  Our political system has somewhat similar assumptions for the oth-
er federal branches as well; both Congress and the Supreme Court have quorum requirements, leaving us 
with the possibility that otherwise valid institutions and officials cannot exercise their powers absent the 
fulfillment of specific triggering conditions. 
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dent.17  If the constitutional text requires that the President recite the oath, 
then the presidential oath cannot itself be the mechanism that completes the 
President-elect‘s transformation into the Commander in Chief. 
Stated slightly differently, the text of the oath clause appears to require 
the existence of a sitting President.18  And if the oath clause specifically an-
ticipates that a President—as opposed to a President-elect—will recite the 
oath, then only the ceremonial ―non-obligate‖ approach (holding that the 
oath is not required for exercising the powers of the Chief Executive) or the 
primed President approach (holding that a President must recite the oath, 
but cannot exercise the Office‘s powers until she does so) remain potential-
ly valid. 
As there seems to be a sound, text-based rationale for rejecting the 
presidential oath as the mechanism for turning Presidents-elect (or other in-
dividuals) into Presidents, we must now sort through these remaining views 
of the oath‘s relationship to the assumption of presidential power: the non-
obligate and primed President models.  Because the constitutional text alone 
is unlikely to resolve this choice, this Essay next examines the history of the 
oath provision.  It might be noted in passing, however, that the conditional 
wording of Article II, stipulating that ―[b]efore he enter on the Execution of 
his Office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation,‖ is rather strong.  
Constitutional language is generally sparse,19 especially with respect to the 
executive branch.  It might be odd, therefore, to discount the oath provi-
sion‘s relatively direct commands as essentially ritualistic and nonbinding 





  Presumably, a restrictive reading of the oath would also require a Vice President to recite the 
presidential oath before exercising the full powers of President. 
18
  One potential counterargument to the primed President approach to the oath arises from the ob-
servation that many of the Chief Justices who administer the presidential oath do not refer to the indi-
viduals who take the oath as ―President‖ beforehand, but by some other appellation (Roberts referred to 
Mr. Obama as ―Senator,‖ for example).  The implication might be that the Chief Justices do not believe 
that the oath-taker is President until he completes the oath.  But this is hardly compelling.  Even if, say, 
Chief Justice Roberts had decided that Mr. Obama was not yet President before the oath, it would surely 
make more sense to address Mr. Obama as ―President-elect‖ rather than Senator (since Mr. Obama had 
resigned his Senate seat over two months prior).  Consequently, it seems difficult to conclude that the 
practice of the Chief Justices in this regard necessarily reflects a carefully considered evaluation of the 
oath‘s meaning and importance.  
19
  See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 91 (1989) (arguing that ―[a]lthough the Consti-
tution is often praised for its relative spareness . . . it is striking that the authors of the 1787 document 
twice saw fit to write in requirements of oath-taking by governmental officials‖). 
20
  Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, the American National Interest, and a Call for 
Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2004) (reviewing discussions of the presidential oath at the 
constitutional convention).  The version of the oath originally proposed by the convention‘s Committee 
of Style required the recitation of the oath before the president ―shall enter on the Duties of his Depart-
ment,‖ but this language was changed ―[f]or unknown reasons‖ when the final copy of the Constitution 
was printed.  Id. at 6. 
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B. History and the Oath 
There is additional evidence to review in sorting through whether the 
―primed President‖ thesis is superior to a view of the oath as essentially un-
related to the President‘s initial assumption of power.  Consider first the ex-
ample of George Washington.  There appears to be little contemporary 
doubt that Washington had, prior to his inauguration and oath, already been 
President for a period of weeks.  Although Congress had fixed March 4, 
1789 as the start of the first President‘s term, the legislature did not even 
count the Electoral College votes for Washington until the end of March.  
On April 6 of that year, the presiding officer of the nascent U.S. Senate, 
John Langdon, sent a note to Washington informing him of his ―unanimous 
election to the Office of President of the United States of America.‖21  After 
receiving the letter on April 14, Washington made a gradual, triumphal trip 
from his Mount Vernon home to the nation‘s capital in New York.22  
Throughout the tour, and upon his appearance in New York, both members 
of the public and government officials addressed Washington as ―Presi-
dent.‖23  Washington finally took his oath and was inaugurated on April 30, 
1789.24  There does not seem to be any historical record of Washington tak-
ing the presidential oath while he was President-elect or, indeed, at any 
point prior to his inauguration in New York.25 
While these observations could lead one to surmise that Washington‘s 
status and powers as President were already in place prior to his taking the 
oath, Washington himself was rather explicit in insisting, during his second 
inaugural address, that ―[p]revious to the execution of any official act of a 
President, the Constitution requires an oath of office.‖26  Washington re-





  Letter from John Langdon to George Washington (Apr. 6, 1789), in THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 
PAPERS 205 (Frank Donovan ed., 1964), available at 
http://www.myloc.gov/Exhibitions/creatingtheus/BillofRights/ForgingaFederalGovernment/ExhibitObje
cts/UnanimousElectionofGeorgeWashington.aspx (link).  See also RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING 
FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHINGTON 72–73 (1996) (discussing Washington‘s election). 
22
  BROOKHISER, supra note 21, at 73.  Even after arriving in New York, Washington waited a week 
while the House and Senate determined how to conduct his inauguration. 
23
  HARLOW GILES UNGER, AMERICA‘S SECOND REVOLUTION 199 (2007) (noting that prior to the 
inauguration churches in New York City called for the public to pray for the ―preservation of the Presi-
dent,‖ and quoting Washington‘s private secretary Tobias Lear‘s discussion of how ―the committees of 
Congress and heads of departments‖ greeted ―the President‖ prior to his taking the oath (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); RICHARD M. KETCHUM, THE WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 217 (1974) (ex-
plaining that as Washington made his way to be inaugurated, ―towns turned out en masse to do the new 
President honor‖). 
24
  STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 45-46 (1995) (describing the 
events leading up to Washington‘s first inauguration). 
25
  Blomquist, supra note 20, at 7 (declaring Washington‘s April 30 oath to be ―the first presidential 
oath‖).  
26
  Id. at 9. 
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that casts additional doubt on the notion that the oath was completely unre-
lated to his assumption of power.27 
A letter written by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1821 further corro-
borates the view that election and the start of a new presidential term make 
a President eligible to take the oath, but only after reciting the oath is a 
President constitutionally empowered to exercise the full powers of the of-
fice.  John Quincy Adams, then serving as Secretary of State, asked Mar-
shall to address a question about the start of President James Monroe‘s 
second term.  Monroe‘s old term was set to end, and his new term to com-
mence, on March 4, 1821, but that date fell on a Sunday.28  Consequently, 
Adams inquired about the consequences of Monroe deferring the oath until 
Monday, March 5.29   
Marshall wrote that the precise timing of the oath-taking was ―in some 
measure at the discretion of [the President].‖30  As a result, ―some interval is 
inevitable‖ between the start of a presidential term and the moment when 
the incoming President takes the oath.31  During this interregnum, Marshall 
concluded, ―the executive power could not be exercised‖ and is ―sus-
pended.‖32  Marshall noted that the Washington presidency had experienced 
a ―prolonged‖ interval in which this state of affairs prevailed.33  Indeed, 
Marshall stated that ―there has been uniformly and voluntarily an interval of 
twelve hours during which‖ the executive power could not be employed by 
a President (because federal law at the time stipulated midnight at the end 
of March 3 as the time when a new term began, and a President customarily 
did not take the oath until noon the following day).34 
The State Department reached a similar conclusion nearly a century 
later.  This time, the issue arose when considering the potential effect of the 





  Id.  Other Presidents have expressed similar thoughts about both the oath‘s general importance 
and its specific status as a prerequisite to the exercise of Chief Executive powers.  See, e.g., id. at 13 
(quoting William Henry Harrison, who remarked: ―I appear before you, fellow-citizens, to take the oaths 
which the Constitution prescribes as a necessary qualification for the performance of [the President‘s] 
duties‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 21 (quoting William McKinley, who said, ―[B]y the 
authority vested in me by this oath, I assume the arduous and responsible duties of President of the Unit-
ed States‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 12 (quoting Andrew Jackson, who declared in his 
Second Inaugural Address that ―he was ‗under the obligation of that solemn oath . . . [to] exert all my 
faculties to maintain the just powers of the Constitution and to transmit unimpaired to posterity the 
blessings of our Federal Union‘‖). 
28
  Wilson to Take the Oath Sunday, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1916, at 4. 
29
  Id. (quoting Letter from John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States, to John Quincy 
Adams, Secretary of State (Feb. 20, 1821)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
30
  Id. 
31
  Id.  
32
  Id. 
33
  Id.  The interval was a result of, among other factors, the delays in Congress‘s counting of the 
electoral college votes and the protracted nature of Washington‘s trip from Virginia to the nation‘s capi-
tal in New York. 
34
  Id.   
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1917 (again, falling on a Sunday), and the scheduled time for the presiden-
tial oath (the following Monday, March 5, at noon).  According to The New 
York Times, the State Department concluded that ―‗there is no interval be-
tween the term of one President and the beginning of his successor[‘s], al-
though there may be a slight interval when the executive power is 
suspended.‘‖35  Presumably influenced by the State Department‘s conclu-
sion, Wilson took the oath in the morning on Sunday, March 4, and again 
during his public, formal inauguration on March 5.36 
Although both the constitutional text and our political history provide 
substantial credence to the primed presidency theory, the concept is more 
problematic when looked at from another perspective. 
C. Constitutional Structure and “Blocked” Executive Power 
As argued above, a defining feature of the American presidency is its 
constancy or ―duration‖—the availability of the Chief Executive to respond 
to national threats and to infuse his distinctive ―energy,‖ decisionmaking, 
―activity, secrecy, and dispatch‖ throughout the constitutional order as a 
whole.37  To conclude that Presidents-elect automatically become President 
at the start of their terms, but cannot constitutionally exercise their presi-
dential powers until after they have recited the oath, seems to create the 
possibility that under the Constitution the exercise of federal executive 
power can be ―blocked.‖  According to the primed President interpretation, 
a President who does not recite the oath is still President, and so the execu-
tive power cannot automatically devolve to, say, the Vice President.  Ra-
ther, the executive power might exist in a state of semi-suspension.  Does 
our Constitution really permit such a curious arrangement?   
Looked at more carefully, this concern is less worrisome than it may 
initially seem.  If a primed President blocks the exercise of executive power 
because she or he is unable to recite the oath due to ―Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the [] Office,‖ the Constitu-
tion allows the Vice President (or some other eligible figure) to assume 





  Id. (quoting ruling of the State Department). 
36
  The actions of several other Presidents-elect provide additional credence to the primed President 
concept.  Facing similar intervals between the start of the term and the scheduled inaugural oath, Presi-
dents Rutherford B. Hayes, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan also took preliminary presidential 
oaths, presumably to stave off any questions about when they could exercise their presidential powers.  
See Franke-Ruta, supra note 8. 
37
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 422–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Cf. 
Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2003) (arguing that one of the ―positive‖ features of the separation of powers is its 
―tendency to foster special qualities associated with good governance . . . [and] linked with individual 
departments‖) (link). 
38
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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If, on the other hand, a President were unwilling to recite the oath, the 
situation would presumably be an extreme form of other circumstances in 
which a President refuses to exercise core executive powers (such as if a 
President declined to nominate individuals to fill vacancies in his or her 
Cabinet or the federal judiciary).  In general, and with important excep-
tions,39 sustained presidential non-performance of executive functions is 
rare.  It would certainly seem unlikely for a President to forswear the oath 
and with it the execution of the full powers of the office of President.  In 
any event, a President who refused to take the oath would, I presume, be 
subject to impeachment or the removal provisions of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.40 
The greatest concerns about primed Presidents potentially blocking the 
exercise of executive power would, therefore, seem to involve that subset of 
circumstances in which a President is delayed, perhaps through no fault of 
his or her own, from taking the oath.  Imagine what would happen if a ter-
rorist attack disrupted the inauguration festivities prior to a primed Presi-
dent‘s recitation of the oath.  Americans might be left with great, and 
possibly dangerous, uncertainty about the status of our Chief Executive and 
the powers of the office. 
The potential for confusion under such circumstances is considerable 
and represents a specific problem within the more general set of puzzles 
posed by our desire to maintain smooth presidential succession and the con-
tinuity of executive leadership during a crisis.41  But it is not clear that this 
problem can be traced strictly to the primed presidency perspective, or that 
alternate views of the oath-term relationship would entirely address the dif-
ficulty. 
Consider, for example, the approach that assumes the oath is a bright-
line prerequisite for turning a President-elect into a President.  Under this 
view, a President-elect who fails to take the oath (or, presumably, takes an 
invalid oath) before his or her term begins does not ―qualify‖ for the office 
of President, prompting the Vice President (or the other figures identified 
under federal succession law) to assume the presidency under the terms of 
the Twentieth Amendment.42  But even though this interpretation would un-
block presidential power, it would also offer the following strange conclu-
sion: it would render the presidential oath so important that a President-
elect who failed to take it would be automatically replaced by the constitu-





  See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION (2002) (detailing strategies Presidents use to resist enforcing federal law and policies). 
40
  See Scott E. Gant, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s Unexplored Removal 
Provisions, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 791 (1999).  
41
  Cf., e.g., CONTINUITY OF GOV‘T COMM‘N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY OF 
CONGRESS (2003), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030605_FirstReport.pdf (providing rec-
ommendations for the continuity of congressional leadership in emergency situations) (link). 
42
  See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (link). 
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however, will, most likely, only have taken the (non-presidential) oath set 
out under the terms of Article VI of the Constitution and federal law.43  
Such a result would seem particularly perverse given that the (bypassed) 
President-elect who failed to take the presidential oath is nevertheless likely 
to have taken the very same (non-presidential) oath recited by the Vice 
President or the other designated successor.44 
Alternatively, we might try to unblock presidential power by resorting 
to a view that holds the presidential oath to be essentially nonbinding as a 
legal matter.  An attack on Inauguration Day that disrupted a President-
elect‘s ability to recite the oath would not matter, because he or she would 
automatically assume the full powers of the office at noon on January 20.  
But again, this approach seems to ignore both the unqualified constitutional 
language regarding the presidential oath as well as the considerable signi-
ficance oath-taking had to those who designed our constitutional order. 
So what would happen if an attack or other crisis prevented a Presi-
dent-elect from reciting the oath under the primed President view?  During 
such an exigency, legal chaos would more likely be sown by uncertainty 
over the identity of the President, as opposed to misgivings about whether 
he or she has correctly stated the oath.  As a practical matter, then, even the 
problems posed by a crisis that disrupts the normal oath process can be seen 
as an argument for the primed President model; at a minimum, this under-
standing of the relationship between the oath and presidential power makes 
clear that a President-elect automatically becomes President at the start of 
his or her term.  Ordinarily, we ask individuals to recite the presidential 
oath before executing the powers of the office of the President.  If fulfilling 
that obligation is temporarily impossible or impractical due to an emergen-
cy, however, we might presume that a President‘s commitment to sustained 
executive leadership and preservation of the nation would trump our con-





  5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (setting out the oath for any ―individual, except the President, elected or 
appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services‖) (link). 
44
  Contemporary Presidents invariably have had a record of prior public service that included at 
least one position covered by the oath provision in Article VI of the Constitution (requiring an oath of all 
―Senators and Representatives . . . and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive 
and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states‖) (link).  President Obama is the 
most recent example, having been a U.S. Senator and a member of the Illinois state legislature before 
becoming President.  Although there is no constitutional requirement that a President have previously 
served in a position requiring a constitutional oath, it is reasonable to expect that many future Presidents 
will have such a background and therefore will have taken an Article VI oath prior to taking a presiden-
tial oath. 
45
  This position is arguably implicit in the Constitution‘s Article II vesting of the ―executive power . 
. . in a President of the United States of America.‖  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (link).  See generally 
Robert Scigliano, The President’s “Prerogative Power,” in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
236 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989) (discussing the argument for the ―Lockean prerogative‖ and the limits 
of such a prerogative in the American context), and JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS (1991) (de-
lineating a theory of constitutional emergency powers).  One might also note that there is no obvious 
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Therefore, in light of the arguments derived from the Constitution‘s 
text and purposes, as well as a review of our political history, we might rea-
sonably conclude that while the start of the presidential term does indeed 
bring in a new President, such a person is (ordinarily) unable to execute the 
powers of the office before reciting the oath.  Accordingly, President-elect 
Obama may have been a primed President from noon on January 20 until 
whenever he properly stated the oath—either a few minutes past noon or, if 
the initial oath was flawed, until the evening of January 21 when he took 
the oath, without any problems, a second time. 
To the extent that this primed President perspective on the oath pre-
vails, we can conclude that the oath should be performed after the start of a 
President‘s term (that is, under the terms of the Twentieth Amendment, at 
noon or later on January 20).46  One potential advantage of this approach is 
that it gives some clarification to the question of how long ―[b]efore‖ ex-
ecuting the presidential office a person can recite the oath.  If the Constitu-
tion permits Presidents-elect to take the oath, they might, logically, be able 
to do so months before assuming the presidency (during some interval be-
tween becoming President-elect and the start of their presidential term).  At 
a minimum, this would seem to be a somewhat curious result given our tra-
ditional efforts to ―time‖ the oath to take place at the start of the new presi-
dential term.  Reading the Constitution as requiring a President to recite the 
oath reinforces what appears to be our longstanding historical sense that the 
oath should be rendered at the time when the President assumes his or her 
powers.  Still, clarifying when the presidential oath may be taken does not 
shed much light on what, exactly, the President must say during the oath‘s 
affirmation.  It is to this question that this Essay now turns.  
II. OATHS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF WORDS 
Even though it is, admittedly, a pretext for a broader exploration of 
constitutional issues, this Essay is animated by a core inquiry: does the im-
perfect presidential oath of January 20, 2009 have an enduring and signifi-
cant impact on the policies or legal authority of the Obama administration?  
If the preceding analysis is correct, a strong case can be made that Mr. Ob-
ama became President at noon on January 20, but did not have the full legal 
capacity to exercise the powers of his office until after he recited the oath.  
The pivotal question, then, is whether Obama‘s deviation from the precise 
language47 of the presidential oath was sufficient to render his oath invalid.  
                                                                                                                           
constitutional prohibition against a President taking an ―emergency‖ oath in private, in front of whatever 
witnesses are available. 
46
  See infra Part IV.B (recommending a change in existing inauguration policy so that future Presi-
dents would take the presidential oath after noon on January 20).  Rutherford B. Hayes took the oath be-
fore his term began but took the oath a second time afterward, perhaps reflecting misgivings about the 
validity of the first recitation.  See Franke-Ruta, supra note 8. 
47
  A different question relates to the precise timing of the oath.  This Essay addresses that issue by 
arguing that an oath must be rendered by a President.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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If so, serious questions about Obama‘s (mis)use of executive power be-
tween January 20 at noon, and his retaking of the oath on January 21, may 
arise. 
We might begin by observing that the semantic meaning conveyed by 
an oath surely matters.  If a President announced during an inauguration 
that he or she would ―denigrate‖ the Office of President or ―faithlessly‖ ex-
ecute its powers, we would likely conclude that the oath was not properly 
rendered.48  Obama‘s verbal miscues, including his misplacement of the 
word ―faithfully,‖ did not obviously amount to this sort of substantive de-
fect; they did not alter the meaning of the oath. 
Nevertheless, we need to consider whether the Constitution‘s presiden-
tial oath clause should be treated as a rigid script or whether it can be 
upheld through variations that affirm its basic purpose.  The answer to this 
query turns on how we understand the oath and the method or mode of con-
stitutional interpretation we adopt. 
Textual and historical analyses seem to point us in different directions 
when considering how literally we should construe the oath provision.  A 
textualist approach might lead to the conclusion that the President must re-
peat the presidential oath verbatim.  After all, the full text of the oath is set 
forth with precision in Article II.  This contrasts with the somewhat unspe-
cified command of the Constitution‘s Article VI, which only requires that 
members of Congress and ―the Members of the several State Legislatures, 
and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Con-
stitution.‖49  The absence of specific constitutional oaths for these non-
presidential officials seems to imply that, while they must pledge some 
general allegiance to the Constitution, the particulars of the presidential 
oath are the most important.50 
A review of the relevant constitutional history paints a more ambi-
guous picture of how we should interpret the oath‘s language in Article II.  





  Cf. Dorf, supra note 2 (discussing hypothetical invalid recitations of the presidential oath). 
49
  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (link). 
50
  See, e.g., Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1314 (2000) (observing that ―in no other constitutional 
provision are the precise words of the actual oath to be taken themselves set forth, as opposed to a gen-
eral command that there be some oath‖) (link).  In addition, one might note that a widely accepted doc-
trine of constitutional interpretation insists upon greater interpretive literalism where textual provisions 
are relatively clear.  See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down a statu-
tory ―line item veto‖ on the grounds that the power deviated from the explicit constitutional require-
ments regarding bill passage) (link); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995) 
(holding that the explicit constitutional language regarding the ―qualifications‖ for members of Congress 
is ―fixed and exclusive‖) (link); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983) (invalidating a one-house 
―legislative veto‖ on the grounds that such a provision ―is not authorized by the constitutional design of 
the powers of the Legislative Branch‖) (link).  The reasoning in these cases might incline one to accept 
the importance of reading the presidential oath verbatim. 
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language by pledging to ―maintain‖ rather than ―protect‖ the Constitution, 
and President Lyndon Johnson spoke the word ―presidency‖ rather than 
―President‖ in his 1965 presidential oath.51  There does not appear to be any 
historical evidence suggesting that these mistakes brought their oaths into 
question at the time they were rendered or at any time thereafter. 
Moreover, for several decades, the prevailing method of oath adminis-
tration had the oath administrator embed the oath in a question to which the 
President would simply say, ―I do‖ or ―I swear.‖  One consequence of this 
affirmation or approval mode is that the oath is not stated verbatim, since 
the administering official changes the pronoun ―I‖ to ―you‖ when reciting 
the oath.  More recently, all of our Presidents have strayed from the Consti-
tution‘s language in adding their own names between the words ―I‖ and ―do 
solemnly swear‖ at the outset of their oath-taking.52  Prior to the Obama-
Roberts gaffe, however, it seems no President has retaken his oath on ac-
count of any deviation from the text.53 
The somewhat variable content of and practices surrounding prior reci-
tations of the oath are, to some extent, offset by the frequency with which 
presidents have invoked the special significance of the presidential oath—
that it is a requirement laid out by the Constitution and a tether between 
current and past Commanders in Chief.54  Arguably, this emphasis unders-
cores the importance of reiterating the presidential oath as precisely as poss-





  See Posting of Tony Mauro, No Problems with Today’s Oath at the Supreme Court, to The BLT: 
The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/01/no-problems-with-todays-oath-at-
the-supreme-court.html (Jan. 21, 2009, 14:09 EST) (link); Posting of Jan Crawford Greenburg, Chief 
Justice Fumbles, to Legalities Blog of ABC News, http://blogs.abcnews.com/legalities/2009/01/chief-
justice-f.html (Jan. 20, 2009, 12:45 EST) (discussing how Taft ―flubbed the oath‖ when administering it 
to Hoover in 1929) (link); Inauguration of Lyndon Johnson (Jan. 20, 1965), (transcript on file with the 
Miller Center for Public Affairs), available at 
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4031 (link). 
52
  The inclusion of a President‘s name could perhaps be construed as being different from other oath 
―deviations,‖ insofar as this alteration of the constitutionally provided oath actually clarifies a Presi-
dent‘s intent to uphold the oath.  Likewise, the nearly unbroken tradition of adding ―so help me God‖ at 
the end of the oath seems to differ in character from other oath variations, because the addition does not 
change the wording of the constitutional oath, but simply appends it. 
53
  John Tyler, who became president after the death of William Henry Harrison, apparently believed 
that he was already qualified to serve as President by virtue of his vice presidential oath.  Nevertheless, 
on April 6, 1841, two days after the death of President Harrison, Tyler took the presidential oath word 
for word ―for greater caution,‖ an approach adopted by subsequent Vice Presidents who achieved the 
presidency through succession rather than election.  Blomquist, supra note 20, at 7 n.23 (quoting 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY‘S GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 263 (Michael Nelson ed., 1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Both Calvin Coolidge and Chester Arthur retook their oaths out of apparent 
misgivings about the status of the person who administered them.  See William F. Brown & Americo R. 
Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: “The Emperor Has No Clones,” 75 GEO. L.J. 
1389, 1401 n.47 (1987). 
54
  See Blomquist, supra note 20, at 7–33 (surveying presidential understandings of the oath from 
Washington to George W. Bush). 
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reflected that he had ―just repeated word for word the oath taken by George 
Washington 200 years ago . . . .‖55 
For what it is worth,56 the founding generation regarded political oaths 
seriously.57  Fueled by their contemporary anxieties about executive power 
and its potential for abuse, the Framers seem to have intended the presiden-
tial oath to be at least semi-contractual and restrictive of the actions of the 
President.58  The most extensive discussion of the presidential oath clause at 
the time of the Constitution‘s debate, drafting, and ratification occurred at 
the Philadelphia convention.  However, according to James Madison‘s 
notes, the pertinent convention discussions focused on differing conceptions 
of the nature and sources of presidential power (such as whether the Presi-
dent should be selected by Congress) and whether the content of the oath 
needed to be adjusted accordingly.59  Apparently, the convention debates 
did not consider whether the oath‘s specific language needed to be pledged 
or affirmed word for word.60 
There is little case law directly relevant to the issues posed in this Es-
say.61  Although a handful of state and federal cases have referenced the 
presidential oath, most of their discussions focus on the ways in which the 
presidential oath informs us about other mandated oaths,62 or what, if any-





  Id. at 33 (quoting JOINT CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURATION CEREMONIES, INAUGURAL 
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 101-10, at 345 (1st Sess. 1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
56
  Cf. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 60–75 (2002) (offering criticisms of ―framer‘s intent‖ as a mode of constitutional 
interpretation). 
57
  See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 19, at 91–94 (discussing the significance of oaths and the pers-
pectives of the Constitution‘s authors and the founding generation more generally).  
58
  See Vic Snyder, You’ve Taken an Oath to Support the Constitution, Now What? The Constitu-
tional Requirement for a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 897, 900 
(2001) (attributing to Chief Justice Warren Burger the ―observation that the framers placed great impor-
tance on [the] exact choice of language‖ of the presidential oath).  Setting aside historical considera-
tions, analysis of the presidential oath clause in the context of constitutional structure is not especially 
revealing.  We may note that the presidential oath is found in Article II, § 1, which deals generally with 
limits on the presidency, as opposed to Article II, § 2, which sets out executive powers.  Matthew Pauley 
makes a similar point in noting that the President‘s ―constitutionally prescribed oath is indeed prescrip-
tive: properly understood, it tells our Presidents what they are obliged to do.‖  PAULEY, supra note 14, at 
19. 
59
  See Blomquist, supra note 20, at 2–6. 
60
  See id. 
61
  See id. at 35–37 (reviewing cases related to the oath). 
62
  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–34 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Presi-
dents‘ use of the Bible in presidential oaths) (link); U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 630 (1931) 
(Hughes, C. J., dissenting) (comparing the presidential oath to other oaths) (link). 
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his or her ability to make independent judgments about constitutional inter-
pretation).63 
At this point, we can summarize this Essay‘s prior analysis with the 
following observations: a plausible case can be made for (a) requiring the 
oath to be recited by a President and not by a President-elect; (b) denying 
the President the full powers of the office until the oath is recited—
potentially ―blocking‖ the exercise of the federal executive power; and (c) 
requiring the oath to be repeated or affirmed verbatim by those who wish to 
exercise the powers of the Chief Executive.64 
Before considering the implications of these conclusions—both with 
respect to the Obama administration specifically and to our understanding 
of inaugurations and oaths more generally—it is worth considering a final 
challenge to their validity by asking the following question: does the analy-
sis of this Essay fail an ―absurdity‖ test? 
III. THE ABSURDITY TEST 
Can we really countenance the primed presidency view and presiden-
tial oath literalism if it leads to seemingly ―stupid‖ results (such as the pos-
sibility of ―blocked‖ executive power)?  Alternatively, might we not 
dismiss as ―frivolous‖ a set of arguments that leaves open the possibility 
that even trivial flaws in the oath process could actually jeopardize the 
power of a duly elected President?65 
We certainly reject literal constitutional interpretation in other contexts 
where it leads to perverse outcomes or conclusions.  Despite the unqualified 
language of the First Amendment, for example, we do not read it as barring 





  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 681–82 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting) (referencing the presidential oath in an argument for broadly interpreting the President‘s 
constitutional powers) (link).  In addition to the absence of even generally pertinent case law, one may 
note that it is an open and serious question whether evaluation of the status of an imperfect presidential 
oath is a justiciable question.  Given the Court‘s decision to abstain from the workings of the constitu-
tional amendment process, on the grounds that such questions about the internal workings of govern-
ment are political questions best left for resolution by a ―political department,‖ it seems at least plausible 
that it would find a challenge to how the President attempted to take the oath and assume the powers of 
the office of President to also be a question not subject to judicial review.  See Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433 (1939) (holding that Congress, not the Court, should define critical aspects of the constitutional 
amendment process, including whether too much time has lapsed between an amendment‘s proposal and 
its ratification by states) (link). 
64
  While hardly decisive, as explained above, the constitutional text and some aspects of our histori-
cal practice lend support to constitutional literalism during recitation of the oath. 
65
  See generally Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional In-
terpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995) (discussing seemingly 
―stupid outcomes‖ coming out of dutiful textual interpretations of the Constitution).  Cf. Dorf, supra 
note 2 (arguing that many semantic deviations do not ―count[] as a failure to take the oath‖ because they 
still provide ―substantial compliance with the terms of the oath‖). 
66
  U.S. CONST. amend. I (link).  See, e.g., U.S. v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a 
statute regulating airline passenger speech) (link). 
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But, of course, there is another tradition in constitutional interpretation that 
insists that one of the potentially painful consequences of being committed 
to the rule of law is that ―sometimes we must make decisions we do not 
like.  We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law 
and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.‖67  Jordan Steiker, 
Sanford Levinson, and Jack Balkin put it more acidly in noting that ―it is 
not at all clear that stupid outcomes are necessarily precluded by the stan-
dard norms of constitutional interpretation.‖68 
Accordingly, perhaps the ―absurdity‖ question should be recast as ask-
ing whether we can ―develop criteria for assessing substantial compliance 
with the terms of the oath,‖ criteria that would allow us to recognize, in a 
consistent and sensible manner, technically ―deviant‖ oaths that neverthe-
less uphold the underlying purposes of the oath clause.69  The advantage of 
such an approach would be obvious—it would overcome the necessity of 
perfect oath recitation as a prerequisite for exercising executive power, vin-
dicating common sense and the practices of many past presidents.   
The disadvantage of a ―substantial compliance‖ norm is its impreci-
sion; it invites controversy over how it will be defined and applied.  Moreo-
ver, as previously noted, interpreting the oath clause as requiring only 
―substantial compliance‖ is a view in tension with both the precise constitu-
tional language and some elements of constitutional history that support a 
more rigid approach.  Although we might ultimately choose to reject oath 
literalism, to insist otherwise does not seem to be an obviously frivolous or 
stupid reading of the Constitution‘s text.70  
In light of these observations, the burden would appear to be on a 
―substantial compliance‖ advocate to identify relatively clear standards to 
distinguish between valid and invalid oath variations.  Presumably, just as 
the contemporary reading of the First Amendment‘s speech protection subs-
titutes a balancing test for a literal, restrictive reading, we might be able to 
assess the validity of a President‘s recitation by weighing several factors, 
including: (a) the proximity of the words spoken to those set out in the Con-
stitution; (b) whether the underlying purposes of the oath are met or sup-
ported by the actual words spoken; and, more controversially perhaps, (c) 
the subjective intentions of the uttering President in deviating from the 
oath‘s text. 
Fully identifying and applying these criteria is no small undertaking—





  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (link). 
68
  Steiker et al., supra note 65, at 246.  We do not seem to have obviously clear or consistent norms 
governing when we can use an ―absurdity test‖ to nullify the results of plausible constitutional interpre-
tation.   
69
  Dorf, supra note 2. 
70
  Michael Dorf goes so far as to say that it would be difficult for someone committed to textualism 
to justify anything but a rigid, literalist approach to the presidential oath.  Id. 
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standards.  Would we lay such responsibilities in the hands of the judiciary71 
or Congress (potentially posing threats to the separation of powers), the ex-
ecutive branch (raising conflict-of-interest problems, particularly if a Presi-
dent evaluated his or her own ―imperfect‖ oath against substantial 
compliance standards), or in several of these institutions?  Lack of consen-
sus on these issues would likely generate sustained attention and continued 
debate about the validity of each imperfect presidential oath, potentially dis-
tracting the President and even eroding some of his or her political legiti-
macy.  The distraction and national disunity would likely be even worse, 
however, if these issues were litigated before a judicial body.  Even if we 
assume such questions would be deemed non-justiciable, the mere filing of 
a lawsuit challenging the presidential oath-taking would surely be political-
ly disruptive.72 
Because of the serious concerns accompanying the formulation of a 
―substantial compliance‖ test, a prudent President might well retreat from 
identifying compliance criteria, embracing instead a rigid, literal reading of 
the presidential oath clause.  The decision of Mr. Obama to retake the oath 
under the watchful eyes of members of the press corps could well be a 
prominent example of this conclusion. 
IV. CONCLUSION: OATH PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 
This Essay has advanced the following basic points about the presiden-
tial oath, the start of the new presidential term, and the ―primed presidency‖ 
thesis: 
 
1. At the start of a new presidential term (Janu-
ary 20 at noon), a President-elect who has 
been validly selected and meets the Consti-
tution‘s other qualifications becomes Pres-
ident. 
2. Such an individual cannot, however, exer-
cise the full powers of the office of Presi-
dent until he or she has completed the 





  A court that attempted to devise and apply ―substantial compliance‖ standards for the presidential 
oath would expose itself to the charge that it was engaging a political question best resolved by another 
branch.  Moreover, judicial examination of presidential oath compliance might sanction similar review 
of purported deviations and problems with non-presidential oaths rendered by thousands of other federal 
and state officials, opening a potential floodgate of controversial, divisive litigation. 
72
  This Essay does not explore the considerable challenges one would face in attempting to bring a 
legal challenge against the President or some other executive branch official based on a flawed presiden-
tial oath.  Presidents generally enjoy considerable immunity for their official actions.  Moreover, as 
noted, it is easy to imagine that courts would not be interested in passing judgment on a dispute over an 
oath and would cite either non-justiciability or the political question doctrine to avoid reviewing the 
matter.  
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3. The oath must be taken by a President as op-
posed to a President-elect; it is essentially 
unavoidable, therefore, that there will be 
some period, however short, between when 
a person becomes the (primed) President 
and when he or she can fully execute the 
office. 
4. While hardly conclusive, a plausible legal 
and pragmatic case can be made that the 
presidential oath should be repeated or af-
firmed verbatim. 
 
Having advanced these basic claims in the preceding analysis, we can 
now move on to a more focused and applied consideration of their practical 
consequences for the current and future administrations. 
A. Problems, Solutions, and the Initial Obama Oath 
According to my thesis, although Barack Obama became President of 
the United States at noon on January 20, 2009, it is not at all obvious he 
was authorized to exercise the powers of his office until roughly 7:35 p.m. 
on January 21 (when he repeated the presidential oath without mishap).  
During the intervening period, President Obama‘s most significant official 
acts included the issuance of two executive orders, one bearing on access to 
presidential records and the other on ethics in the executive branch.73  This 
Essay suggests that the legal standing of these measures is in some doubt, 
notwithstanding the insistence of Obama‘s Press Secretary that the Office 
of Legal Counsel ―continues to believe that the President was sworn in ap-
propriately and effectively.‖74 
One response to this conclusion is simply to maintain that any legal  
challenges to the first two executive orders based upon questions about the 
status of the initial Obama oath would be dismissed by the courts on the 
grounds that the party or party bringing suit lacked standing, or by invoking 
various non-justiciability claims.  But this outcome would hardly eliminate 
potential controversy about the status of the executive orders.  Even if the 
Obama administration contended that the two orders were valid, Congress 
might disagree, and, in any event, their continued effectiveness would likely 
be undermined if individuals challenged their status, even without any hope 





  Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009) (easing access to executive branch 
records by revoking a more restrictive Bush administration executive order) (link); Exec. Order No. 
13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (Jan. 21, 2009) (preventing administration officials who were previously 
lobbyists from participating in any matters related to their prior lobbying activities for two years after 
being appointed, as well as providing other ethics guidelines) (link). 
74
  See Press Release, The White House, supra note 6. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/26/ 31 
Alternatively, Michael Dorf has argued that if these initial executive 
orders were ever questioned as a legal matter, and someone were ―deemed 
to have legal standing to argue that [they were] void, President Obama 
could simply sign them again.‖75  But this response is not wholly satisfacto-
ry.  If, for example, a former Obama administration employee attempted to 
join a lobbying firm under circumstances that violated the (invalid) Obama 
ethics order, re-signing the executive order would have no bearing on the 
legality or propriety of the employee‘s prior conduct.76  Presumably, em-
ployees working under the invalid order would only be bound by whatever 
administrative rules (and federal laws) were validly in place during their 
employment.  As a consequence, President Obama should reissue these two 
orders as soon as possible, to satisfy, at a minimum, the same ―abundance 
of caution‖ standards that originally animated his decision to recite the pres-
idential oath for a second time.77 
B. Presidential Oaths Going Forward 
Setting aside the inauguration of 2009, this Essay has several implica-
tions for the presidential oath process going forward.  In most regards, my 
analysis does not suggest the need for significant constitutional or proce-
dural changes. With few exceptions, the presidential oath has been recited 
very close to noon on the first day of the new President‘s term, leaving the 
nation with a primed (though not fully operational) President for a brief pe-
riod that is usually measured in minutes.  
One might note, however, that recent inaugurations have scheduled the 
oath to occur before noon (Obama‘s oath, for example, was originally sche-
duled to be administered at 11:56 a.m.).  For first-time Presidents, this is a 
mistake.  Although delays are typically incipient to inaugural ceremonies, 
this Essay‘s claim that oaths must be taken by Presidents, rather than Presi-
dents-elect, suggests that the oath process should only take place after the 
start of the President‘s new term (noon or later).  The official inaugural 





  Dorf, supra note 2. 
76
  Indeed, the Constitution‘s prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws would seem 
to provide some protection under these circumstances.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (link). 
77
  One might imagine that the Obama administration could explore whether a court would be will-
ing to issue a nunc pro tunc order, which would authorize the executive order retroactively.  But these 
orders are generally issued based on an error or delay caused by the court itself, which is not at issue 
with respect to Obama and his initial executive orders. 
78
  It is not entirely clear what implications this argument has for a President who wishes to exercise 
presidential power in more than one presidential term—a person who has already taken a valid presiden-
tial oath in one term who is then elected to a second term (or otherwise becomes or acts as President in a 
second term).  This person has already taken the oath ―[b]efore . . . [entering] on the Execution of his 
Office‖ for his or her first term.  Must this President recite the oath again before the second term in order 
to exercise presidential powers?  Does it matter if the two terms are consecutive?  While interesting, 
these questions move us beyond the 2009 oath and are, therefore, beyond the primary focus of this Es-
say. 
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Furthermore, in order to help alleviate concerns about oath errors or 
the potential that delays in taking the oath could lead to interruptions in the 
President‘s full assumption of power, a President could take the oath pri-
vately, at noon or later, before the formal inauguration ceremony—at which 
point he or she could take it again.79 
Finally, one may note that although different proverbial reasonable 
minds might reach varied conclusions on the topic, constitutional prudence 
suggests that Presidents should endeavor to recite an oath that adheres pre-
cisely to the text laid out in Article II of the Constitution.  Such a ―conserv-
ative‖ approach would presumably satisfy the most restrictive readings of 








  As noted, having a private oath immediately after noon and prior to a more public oath would al-
so have the additional advantage of ―unblocking‖ the executive power in the event of a crisis, ensuring 
not only that the identity of the President is continuous but also that executive power could be wielded 
without interruption or confusion.  This Essay also points to the wisdom of continuing our current prac-
tice of having Vice Presidents-elect recite their own oath before Presidents recite their oaths.  If a primed 
President is incapacitated or otherwise unable to exercise her duties, the Vice President is still affected 
by the existing constitutional (and statutory) law regarding succession.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 
(link). 
